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and Credit Unions: mustrations from the Dominican Republic 
by 
Jeffrey Poyo, Oaudio Gonzalez-Vega and Nelson Aguilera-Alfred1 
I. Introduction 
Financial markets in the Dominican Republic are extremely fragmented (CamaA::bo 
and Gonzalez-Vega, 1992). In Santo Domingo and a few large towns, intense competition 
among formal intermediaries has led to the introduction of the latest banking technology, 
while a short distance away, in dozens of smaller towns, not even the most basic financial 
services are provided to the local population. To satisfy their demand for deposit services 
rural households must travel long distances and incur significant transaction costs. Access 
to formal credit is hampered by even greater obstaA::les, as costly screening, monitoring, and 
contract enforcement leads banks to ration clients out of their portfolios. As a result, the 
rural population depends on informal markets, such as moneylenders, pawnshops, SANs 
1 Jeffrey Poyo, now with the InterAmerican Development Bank:, was the long-term 
resident advisor of the Rural Savings Mobilization Project (1983-86) and the Rural Financial 
Services Program (1988-92), sponsored by the Agency for International Development and 
the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, and implemented by The Ohio State 
University. Oaudio Gonzalez-Vega is Professor of Agricultural Economics and EconomiQ; 
at The Ohio State University and was Principal Investigator, responsible for overall direction 
of the two projects. A graduate of Ohio State, Nelson Aguilera-Alfred is now Associate 
Professor of Agricultural Economics at the Catholic University of Chile. The authors are 
particularly grateful to Adalgisa Adams, Dominican Director of the projects, and to 
numerous Dominican colleagues who participated in this wonderful enterprise. 
1 
2 
(rotating credit schemes), and the financial relationships between farmers and their input 
suppliers or those who purchase their output.2 
Despite substantial injections of funds by international donor and lending institutions 
over the past decades, access of the majority of the rural population to formal financial 
services has not improved significantly, if at all. Those efforts merely achieved a short-lived 
expansion in the supply of subsidized credit to a select target population and, in the process, 
seriously weakened the institutions that served as intermediaries. The poor performance 
of the organizations that have traditionally served as channels for the credit programs of 
international donors is a cause of concern. 
This paper focuses on the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the rural 
credit unions (CUs) of the Dominican Republic, both of which have served as important 
conduits for international credit programs. Between 1984 and 1992, AID financed two 
projects designed to strengthen rural financial markets in this country.3 The efforts entailed 
the provision of specialized technical assistance in support of profound policy reforms within 
the ADB and about 17 rural credit unions. In addition, technical assistance was provided 
to the Central Bank, to secure policy reforms that would complement the successful micro-
economic transformation of particular intermediaries. The approach used to promote policy 
changes at the Central Bank was research on basic policy issues, including the observation 
2 By not immediately withdrawing money owed by the buyer of their crop, farmers 
obtain the safekeeping function that would otherwise be provided by a formal financial 
intermediary, although at higher risks and costs. 
3 These projects were the Rural Savings Mobilization Project (1983-1986) and the Rural 
Financial Services Project (1988-1992). 
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of lessons from the institutional experiments, while in the case of rural financial interme-
diaries the strategy was to integrate them into the domestic financial markets via the intro-
duction of voluntary deposit mobilization and the adoption of modem banking practices. 
The operational deficiencies of the ADB have usually been dismissed as an example 
of the drawbacks of public sector institutions. This interpretation is not sufficient, however, 
to understand the reasons for the similar problems faced by (private) rural credit unions.4 
The CUs have been used by donors as conduits for their lending programs as well, with 
similar results. This paper illustrates how the theory of agency can be used to explain why 
different types of institutions confront similar problems. In addition, the importance of the 
introduction of voluntary deposit mobilization at the ADB and the CUs, in altering tradi-
tiona! agency relationships and in improving performance, is also discussed. 
II. Agency Relationships 
According to Eggertsson (1990), agency relationships are established when "a princi-
pal delegates some rights --for example, user rights over a resource- to an agent who is 
bound by a (formal or informal) contract to represent the principal's interest in return for 
payment of some kind" (p. 40). While the agent is contracted to provide services in repre-
sentation of the principal, agency costs appear as it faces its own utility maximization pro-
blem. Thus, its actions may diverge from those that are in the best interest of the principal 
The principal must incorporate pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives (bonding costs) and 
4 For the drawbacks of public development banks, see Bhatt; Cuevas and Graham; 
Graham and Bourne; Von Pischke; and Von Pischke, Hefferman and Adams. For a 
discussion of these problems in the credit unions, see Poyo (1986), and Poyo (1989). 
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monitoring in order to limit the deviations of the agent In addition, there are losses for the 
principal as long as decisions taken by the agent diverge from those that would maximize 
the principal's objective. The sum of these costs are referred to as agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling). 
Most important for the purposes of applying agency theory to the case of financial 
intermediaries is the basic definition of a firm proposed by Jensen and Meckling: 
Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but 
with suppliers, customers, creditors. The problem of agency costs and monitoring 
exists for all of these contracts. .• V'zewing the finn as the nexus of a set of 
contracting relationships among individuals also serves to make it clear that the 
personalization of the firm implied by asking questions such as "what should be 
the objective function of the firm ~ .. is seriously misleading. The firm is not an 
individual (p. 310). 
Viewing the financial intermediary as a legal fiction designed to execute a series of 
contracting relationships is a useful paradigm. The typical agency problem is discussed in 
terms of the costs for the owners of the financial institution to induce an appropriate beha-
vior of the managers. In the case of the ADB and the rural credit unions there has been 
not one set of, but multiple principals. Both the ADB and the CUs have been used as a 
vehicle through which the Government (GODR) and international organizations have 
attempted to achieve the objectives of their own programs in the rural areas. In both these 
types of institutions there are, therefore, not one but several different agency relationships, 
which may actually enter into conflict with one another. 
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Moreover, in the typical agency problem, the principal is usually interested in the 
profitability and financial viability of the organization, while the agent's interests may 
threaten the performance of the firm. The multiple principals in the ADB and credit union 
cases are frequently not interested in the viability of the intermediary, as their own external 
objectives may take precedence over the permanency of the organization. Furthermore, 
monitoring of the agent's behavior by these multiple principals is not only weak (because 
they are usually distant, particularly in the case of foreign donors), but is frequently focused 
on dimensions (e.g., fnlfiJlment of targeting goals) not relevant for financial viability. 
Problems arise, therefore, not only from the agent's pursuit of its own utility maximization 
efforts, but from the actions taken by the agent in an effort to fulfill its contractual obliga· 
tions with alternative principals. 
III. Agency Relationships at the Agricultural Development Bank 
The ADB is a public sector bank, with a portfolio highly concentrated in rice and 
agrarian reform loans. With 32 branches and 39 smaller satellite offices, it is the single in· 
stitution with the widest network of branches in the country. Since its creation in 1945, the 
only service provided until 1984 was credit. A typical development sector bank, ADB has 
faced severe operational problems, which have undermined its financial viability. Still, it is 
the largest formal intermediary lending to the agricultural sector, accounting for 45 percent 
of the bank's agricultural portfolio. In recent years, virtually all of its funding has come 
from domestic sources, given a serious image problem with international institutions. 
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Although it has maintained agency relationships with several donors, the most important one 
is with the Government. 
The ADB acts as an agent for the GOD~ providing financial support for its policies 
in the agricultural sector. The specific programs have varied over time, but their objectives 
have included support for agrarian reform, income redistn"bution through subsidized credit 
programs, production of basic grains in order to achieve self-sufficiency in basic food staples 
(rice, beans), lower prices for urban consumers, and agricultural diversification. Because 
of the interest of international donors in credit programs, the ADB has also served as a 
mechanism through which the GODR can borrow foreign exchange at highly subsidized 
interest rates, for balance of payments support. The ADB has thus served two important 
functions as an agent for the GODR: it provides financial support for public policies in the 
rural economy, and it serves as a conduit to gain access to foreign exchange. 
The ADB acts, in addition, as an agent for international institutions and foreign 
governments. Unlike the agency relationships with the GOD~ its contracts with foreign 
principals are explicit. Because of the requirement that the GODR serve as a guarantor, 
the ADB has usually received project-generated local currency from the GODR as an equity 
injection, rather than as a loan, and has not been responstble for repayment of principal or 
interest. 
The contracts with both sets of principals have been extremely paternalistic, inducing 
the ADB to lend money to high-risk, default-prone clientele. Some of these credit programs 
are of a fiscal nature, which appropriately belong in a welfare agency rather than a financial 
institution. Subsidized funds and the fiscal nature of the objectives implicit in the 
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contractual relationships with its principals had completely isolated the ADB from the 
discipline imposed by competition for funds in the marketplace. 
The fiscal nature of these contracts promoted a highly centralized operational 
structure, lack of accountability, deficient risk management, technological obsolescence, and 
limited investment in human capital. The ADB's operational structure evolved in response 
to the incentives implicit in these agency relationships. The financial operations carried out 
under each one of the separate contracts is executed through a different plan, each with its 
own set of policies, standards, and target groups. 
In addition, the ADB's Administrator has his own objective function, which may place 
his decisions and actions in direct conflict with the objectives of the institution's principals. 
The top position within ADB is filled by a political appointee, who may have aspirations of 
his own, thus injecting into the decisions another element completely alien to the main 
functions of a financial intermediary. Because the Administrator may obtain political capital 
from the fiscal nature of some of the agency relationships, it may be in his interest to 
encourage these contracts. Evidently, the administrators of this institution may have quite 
a varied range of objectives. What is important to understand is how these objectives 
complement or enter in conflict with the objectives of other principals. 
IV. Depositors as Principals 
In the early 1980s, the Agency for International Development (AID) asked The Ohio 
State University (OSU) to design a new credit program for the ADB. The bank was once 
again requesting external funding, as the decapitalization of the institution had deteriorated 
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its loanable funds base. The OSU team recommended that AID assistance be focused on 
strengthening the institution, rather than on a new agricultural credit project to deal with 
the short-term needs of farmers. It was suggested that the new project help the ADB 
become more self-reliant, through the introduction of deposit mobilization. By exposing the 
bank to the discipline of market competition, it was hoped that the agency problems asso-
ciated with the external dependence would be ameliorated. It was recognized that the 
introduction of deposit mobilization would create tensions and frictions within the ADB, 
because of the inherent conflict with traditional agency relationships. 
After over a year of discussion and preparation, in mid-1984 the ADB offered its 
clients, on a voluntary basis, access to both passbook savings accounts and time deposits. 
Ceilings on the interest rates to be paid on deposits had traditionally been set by the Central 
Bank, and had not been modified significantly to compensate for rising inflation. The ADB 
was authorized to pay the same rates as the rest of the banks: a maximum of 6 percent per 
annum on passbook savings accounts and 10 percent on 12-month time deposits. The ADB 
obtained preferential treatment with regard to reserve requirements, which were set at 10 
percent, compared to 30 percent for the commercial banks. In addition, the bank entered 
the rural market with a slight advantage, as a result of its extensive physical infrastructure. 
With the signing of this technical assistance Project, AID significantly altered its 
contractual relationship with the ADB. Rather than funds for credit, the ADB was to re-
ceive technical assistance in order to implement deposit services. Although the introduction 
of deposit mobilization was to be restricted only to a few branches throughout the life of the 
project (1983-1987), client pressure and desire on the part of the Administrator to obtain 
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political exposure for the upcoming presidential election led the ADB to quickly offer these 
services at all branches. In this particular case, the objectives of the Administrator served 
to promote the expansion of deposit mobilization and helped to break down the opposition 
this new activity found among most of the employees. 
In the first stages of the Project, some branch managers resisted the introduction of 
deposit services, for several reasons: greater work load on the already taxed branches, 
increased personal accountability for the funds, pessimism with regard to the ability to 
mobilize savings from the rural population, and belief in the inability of farmers to pay the 
higher interest rates on loans that would be required if savings were to be mobilized at 
competitive rates. Once the demand for this service among the rural population became 
evident, however, branch managers became the most fervent supporters. They were con-
fronted on a daily basis by borrowers frustrated by the ADB's inability to disburse approved 
loans in a timely fashion, and deposit mobilization empowered them to manage their local 
cash flow and better respond to their client's needs. Their ability to mobilize local deposits 
began to introduce some degree of flexibility and independence from the Main Office. 
Eventually, branch managers became the most vocal advocates of more competitive interest 
rates and more attractive incentives for depositors. 
The greatest resistance came from key department heads in the Main Office who 
recognized that decentralization undermined their power within the institution. The result-
ing limited financial independence introduced an important catalyst toward administrative 
decentralization. The ADB's internal contractual relationships have been significantly 
altered as a result of this program. An entirely new dimension was introduced into the 
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contractual relationships with the employees, as monetary and non-monetary incentives were 
adopted in relation to deposit mobilization. 
Interest rates paid on deposits remained low because of ceilings imposed by the 
Central Bank.5 As a result, in the short run the ADB was able to institute this new service 
without confronting the dilemma of raising its lending rates of interest. In addition, the 
ADB was able to introduce this new service without any significant increase in operating 
costs, because of the underutilization of bank personnel in the Main Office and the 
computerization of several tasks, with assistance from the projects. 
During the initial stages, the ADB imposed severe limitations on the borrowers who 
could qualify for these funds, as a result of risk aversion on the part of its Board of 
Directors. For the first time, the Bank was confronted with the responsibility to manage 
funds which carried no external contractual restrictions on their use, but which would not 
tolerate borrower delinquency. Eventually, excess liquidity underscored the need for the 
restrictions to be relaxed. The ADB has developed great proficiency in the administration 
of these resources, and it has been able to achieve this virtually without delinquency. This 
important issue will be explored in greater depth below. 
In late 1986, following project recommendations, the Central Bank reduced the mini-
mum size of financial certificates, from DR$100,000 to only DR$10,000, and raised the maxi-
mum interest rate to 18 percent per annum. 6 This represented a major revision of the regu· 
5 The main incentive for depositors was the reduction in their transaction costs 
(Guerrero). 
6 These deposit amounts were equivalent to US$35, 700 and US$3,570, respectively. 
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lated interest rate structure, as the new instrument effectively replaced time deposits, and 
the ADB was confronted with the need to revise its lending rates, if it were to remain com-
petitive in the market for deposits, by offering the financial certificate. The bank delayed 
the decision to request authorization from the Central Bank for the use of the financial 
certificate, because of the expectation that the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) 
would approve its request for a new US$65 million credit program. Finally, confronted with 
a serious decapitalization and no hope for the subsidized funding from the IDB, towards the 
end of 1987 the ADB requested and received authorization to use the financial certificate, 
but not before some of its term depositors had withdrawn their funds (see Table 1 ). The 
ADB resolved the interest rate quandary by raising its lending rate minimally and by not 
offering the maximum rate on the financial certificates. Up until 1990, the ADB's rates on 
large deposits remained significantly below those offered by the competition. 
Table 1 
Dominican Republic: Agricultural Development Bank. 
Deposit Mobilization. 
(December 31 of each year) 
(DR $ '000) 
Total Savings Mobilization 
Year Passbook Time Financial (DR$) (US$) 
Accounts Deposits Certificates 
1984 1,169 1,762 0 2,931 951 
1985 4,231 2,835 0 7,066 2,437 
1986 7,982 2,620 0 10,602 3,453 
1987 13,816 5,322 1,840 20,978 4,299 
1988 33,175 2,338 7,116 42,629 6,661 
1989 42,751 2,885 6,106 51,742 6,211 
1990 58,849 2,434 19,567 80,850 6,025 
1991 101,500 2,800 186,900 291,200 22,983 
1992 131,300 2,400 216,700 350,400 27,656 
Source: Banco Agricola de Ia Republica Dominicana, unpublished records. 
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The ADB has not obtained any significant new funding from foreign donor or credit 
institutions since 1983, when it signed its last contract with the IDB. The GODR entered 
into a Stand-by agreement with the IMF in 1985, and as a result its support of the ADB 
declined By the end of 1986, the real value of the bank's loan portfolio had fallen to a 
level below what it had been ten years before. With the new administration that took power 
at the end of 1986, and until 1988, the ADB received almost DR$500 million from the 
GODR, once again in the form of equity contributions. By 1989 and 1990, however, the 
GODR could no longer provide sufficient funding, and with domestic inflation on the rise, 
the growth in the nominal loan portfolio could not keep pace with rising prices. In real 
terms, the portfolio declined once again. Not purely by coincidence, 1990 was the year when 
the ADB embarked on its most aggressive deposit mobilization campaign ever. Interest 
rates on deposits and loans were raised to the ceilings established by the Central Bank for 
the first time in the ADB's history. By 1991, all interest rate controls were eliminated and 
the Bank embarked on a very aggressive policy, paying some of the highest rates in the 
market. 
The ADB has gone through a significant revolution with the introduction of deposit 
services. As expected, this new activity created important frictions within the institution, not 
only because of operational requirements which could not be adequately addressed by the 
existing structure, but also because of implicit ideological differences.' With deposit mobili-
zation, a previously unknown principal was introduced into an agency relationship with the 
7 Some of these constraints were an excessive administrative centralization, lack of a 
management information system, and lack of appropriate employee training. 
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ADB: the depositing public. For the first time, bank employees became acutely aware of 
the need for a dynamic pricing policy which responded to rapidly changing market condi-
tions, requiring an effective management information system, which up to this point was 
non-existent. Although depositors do not participate in the direct supervision of bank 
operations, the perceived threat of a massive withdrawal of deposits served to constrain 
attempts to use the ADB as a political instrument. 
Deposit mobilization generated important constraints with regard to liquidity manage-
ment, because of the uncertainty introduced by the unknown demand for cash of passbook 
depositors. The need for immediate and accurate data transmission from the branches, for 
purposes of liquidity management and holdings of reserve requirements at the Central Bank, 
rapidly demonstrated the inadequacies of the existing computer system. The manual compu-
tation and posting of interest earned on a monthly basis on more than 160,000 accounts 
became unmanageable. Although the Project provided for the donation of microcomputers 
to be installed in all the branches, to promote their complete and decentralized automation, 
those in charge of the computer center at the Main Office aggressively resisted these 
changes. Although these first attempts were unsuccessful because of internal resistance, 
eventually these individuals were removed and since then the ADB has invested large sums 
of its own resources to modernize its computing facilities. 
The most difficult obstacle to overcome, however, was related to the ideological 
implications of the introduction of deposit mobilization. In the past, agency contracts 
promoted the paternalistic and fiscal nature of the ADB, emphasizing the need for subsi-
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dized interest rates and the implicit acceptance of repayment delinquency.8 The GODR 
and foreign governments or donor agencies would absorb the loses implicit in the enormous 
delinquency problems of these credit programs. The presumed inability to pay a higher rate 
of interest for agricultural loans on the part of the small farmers was used as one of the 
main arguments to object to the introduction of this new service. Despite the fact that 
deposit mobilization reduced their financial margins, and transferred the risks on their 
shoulders, branch managers became the most ardent supporters of this new service. 
Although the introduction of deposit mobilization in the ADB has led to fairly signifi-
cant changes within the institution, its agency relationship with the GODR continues to 
dominate its operations, since in relative terms deposits only represent about 10 percent of 
total assets.9 This experience has shown, however, that the performance associated with 
each one of the various lines of credit is a function of the terms and conditions of the 
relationships between the bank and its principals. Serious delinquency and operational 
inefficiencies are the result of the implicit incentives and conflicts of each one of the agency 
relationships the ADB maintains. Significant improvements in institutional performance can 
only be expected if the different contractual relationships are analyzed and reformed. The 
ADB was introduced to the disciplines of the market place precisely at the time when its 
access to subsidized external funding was severely restricted. 
8 For an analysis of these subsidies, see Aguilera-Alfred and Gonzalez-Vega (1992). 
9 Deposits account, however, for about 40 percent of the annual flow of new loans. 
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V. Loaa DeUnquency aad Contractual Relationships at the ADB 
Loan delinquency is the most serious problem threatening the institutional viability 
of the ADB. Because of deficient indicators, its true dimensions and trends are impossible 
to ascertain. The proportion of a portfolio in arrears can seriously misrepresent the 
problem when the portfolio is growing rapidly and contains a diverse mix of loan maturities. 
To avoid these difficulties, actual performance is best measured by following the evolution 
through time of the status of loans disbursed at different points in time. 
A multinomial logit model was estimated for a sample of loans disbursed during 
1986-89 by the ADB, in an attempt to identify variables that would explain the serious loan 
delinquency problems faced by this institution (Aguilera-Alfred and Gonzalez-Vega, 1993). 
Three types of explanatory variables were used: (a) borrower features; (b) loan characteris-
tics; and (c) regulatory instruments. The results confirm the predictions of the analytical 
paradigm adopted here. The introduction of deposit mobilization apparently did have an 
influence on the risk-taking behavior of the Bank, resulting in significant reductions in loan 
delinquency. Among the most important conclusions is that the screening procedures used 
by branch managers were in fact successful. Loans disbursed to applicants who had been 
rated (ex ante) as good credit risks were less likely to be in default than those loans dis-
bursed to borrowers that had been classified as poor credit risks. One may ask why loans 
are disbursed to clients the bank bas identified as poor credit risks? The reasons for this 
are to be found in the contractual restrictions (terms and conditions) imposed on the Bank 
by its external principals (Government and international donor and credit agencies). 
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An analysis of delinquency by source of funding confirmed that repayment problems 
are positively correlated to the degree of targeting imposed in their relationship with their 
external principals. The lowest delinquency rates (average of 23 percent over four years) 
are found on those loans funded from deposits from the public.10 The next lowest delin-
quency figures were obtained on a line of credit from USAID which did not place any 
targeting requirements upon the bank (averaging 8.5 percent).11 As the targeting require-
ments imposed by external creditors increase, so does the probability of borrower delinquen-
cy. Delinquency on loans funded with government resources averaged 143 percent, while 
for those financed with international donor and lending institutions averaged 323 percent. 
The restrictions imposed by the principals on the bank's own screening procedures 
were found to have a strong impact on loan delinquency. Ceteris paribus, those clients 
financed with resources that imposed targeting requirements which limited the ability of the 
Bank to exercise appropriate risk management were found to have a higher probability of 
repayment problems. Branch managers were in fact quite successful in identifying good 
from bad credit risks when no externally imposed conditions restricted their behavior, as in 
the case of funds obtained directly from the public or from an untied external line of credit. 
10 These delinquency figures do not reflect actual default rates, which are significantly 
under 1 percent for the entire period from 1984- 1992. 
11 Once again, these figures do not reflect actual default rates on these resources. 
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VI. Open-Membership Rural Credit Unions 
The first financial cooperatives in the Dominican Republic were established in the 
m.id-1940s through the efforts of the Catholic Church. In 1949, following the American 
model, credit unions were affiliated into a national-level federation (FEDOCOOP), an 
umbrella organization to offer technical assistance, representational, and financial interme-
diation services. Between 1950 and 1957, the Church sought external funding for its 
promotional efforts and the numbers of CUs and members rapidly grew. As the Church 
entered into conflict with the Government, the system was open to direct repression and it 
began to come apart. Between 1958 and 1961, the numbers of institutions and members 
declined. The federation was reorganized with help from the Alliance for Progress. It 
received operating subsidies and grants from various sources during the 1970s. By 1979, 116 
credit unions were registered, with a total membership of about 37,000. Only 96 were 
active, however, and only 25 had full-time managers. 
In 1971, several federations formed the Latin American Confederation of Savings and 
Loan Cooperatives. The creation of COI.AC was a strategic decision, in order to improve 
the access of the individual federations to a much larger pool of subsidized funds from 
international donors (Rabines et al). These funds would be lent to the national federations, 
for on-lending to the individual CUs and finally to their members. Since the CUs provided 
financial services to a segment of society that did not have access to formal credit, this 
system provided an attractive conduit for the international organizations to transfer large 
sums of subsidized funds to small agricultural producers. 
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The vast majority of the CUs had difficulties in collecting the loans disbursed under 
these programs, undermining the financial viability of both the national federations and 
COI.AC. By the early 1980s, COI.AC had accumulated US$265 million of total assets and 
a loan portfolio of US$23 million. Membership in the system had grown from about 850,000 
in 1970 to almost 2.3 million. By the end of 1988, the COI.AC system had US$720.6 million 
of total assets and a loan portfolio of US$520.3 million. The 17 federations affiliated 
claimed a total membership of 3.8 million. The system confronted difficulties with a non-
performing loan portfolio, to the point of threatening its existence. 
VII. Agency Relationships and Credit Unions 
The high transaction costs confronting rural households in their efforts to obtain 
access to financial services provide a strong motivation for group action in the organization 
of financial cooperatives. CUs are institutions where the clients are at the same time the 
owners. Collective action on the part of their members is indispensable for their administra-
tion.12 The achievement of any common goal means that a collective good bas been 
provided (Olson). Since none of the members can be excluded from the potential benefits, 
there are no incentives to contribute to the common effort. Thus, despite the common ob-
jective to obtain financial services, it does not follow that credit union members will volun-
tarily exert all the effort required. A free rider problem is an important source of problems 
12 Typically, CUs are administered by a board of directors not remunerated for their 
work. When the CUs are small, there are no full-time employees, and the treasurer 
manages the funds. Once these institutions grow beyond a critical size, full-time employees 
become a necessity. 
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for these organizations, as managers and boards of directors will not be sufficiently 
disciplined. 
An additional source of problems results from the conflicting objectives of its 
members since, in a self-financing CU, transactions are carried out on both sides of the 
market (as depositors and borrowers) and the entire supply of savings and demand for loans 
derives from their membership. In their dual role as owners and clients, their utility is a 
function not only of the allocation of residual income but, likely of greater importance, of 
the interest rate structure, transaction costs, collateral requirements, and other dimensions 
of loan and deposit contracts, that reflect the quality of the financial services received. 13 
Policy decisions inCUs are inherently conflictive, since they carry important income 
redistribution consequences among the owners (Flannery, Taylor). The utility maximization 
problem cannot be represented by a single objective function since, for example, the utility 
of those who are primarily depositors is positively related to the interest rate paid on 
deposits, while the borrowers' utility is negatively related to interest rates charged on 
loans.14 In addition, policies that maximize the member's short-term utility as clients, may 
come into conflict with those required for the long-term viability of the institution. 
13 Considering that CUs have been promoted as non-profit institutions, and that they 
tend to service individuals without access to other sources of finance, those variables that 
affect the conditions of the services contracted with the credit union tend to weigh more 
heavily than the benefits received as claimants of the residual income. 
14 In the past, since the interest rate structure was essentially predetermined by the 
ideological foundations of the credit union system, the question of raising interest rates to 
mobilize more resources was anathema. 
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In conclusion, in addition to the typical agency costs that derive from the separation 
of ownership and management, the CUs faced problems of free riders and the conflicting 
objectives of their member /owners as borrowers and as lenders. This would suggest that 
these mutual organizations would suffer from greater agency problems than the typical cor-
poration. Eggertsson points out that competition in capital markets and in the market for 
managers contributes to limit the agency problems that result from the separation of owner-
ship and control. Variations in stock prices, in response to poor management, serve as 
signals that reduce the monitoring costs to owners and thus tend to limit opportunistic 
behavior on the part of the decisionmakers. Because CUs are isolated from these competi-
tive pressures, the monitoring costs to the members are higher and agency costs greater. 
A study comparing stock and mutual savings and loan associations provided evidence to 
confirm that the mutual form of organization suffers from greater agency costs.15 
Although CUs in the Dominican Republic date back to the 1940s, they are among 
the weakest in Latin America. Their ideological foundation has been rife with paternalistic 
philosophy. Their original raison d'etre was to combat evil moneylenders, who have tradi-
tionally been the only source of credit for the rural population, and to promote the habit 
of saving. Both ideology and regulation have embodied a clear bias in favor of net borrow-
ers.16 This bias was reinforced as higher domestic inflation during the 1980s turned interest 
15 Nicols found that the mutuals had higher cost functions, slower growth rates, and less 
activity in marketing (Eggertsson). 
16 Dominican cooperative law limits dividend payments on shares to 5 percent per 
annum, and part of the annual profits are returned to borrowers based on their patronage 
of the credit union. 
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rates highly negative in real terms. The potential internal conflict with regard to interest 
rates did not materialize, however, as it was considered heresy within the particular interpre-
tation of cooperative philosophy to suggest raising rates in order to compensate for the 
impact of inflation. The members, realizing the loss in real value of their savings, and not 
being able to obtain the credit services desired, withdrew their investment in the organiza-
tion, by requesting automatic loans equal to their share balances and then becoming 
delinquent. 
In an effort to stem this decline, service diversification was promoted by local and 
international cooperative organizations. The CUs requested a reform in their legal charter, 
in order to become multiservice cooperatives, and proceeded to open small supermarkets, 
pharmacies, household appliance stores, pig f~ furniture factories, and the like. The 
failure of the vast majority of these non-financial activities accelerated the demise of the 
system. These other activities were characterized by markets with a large number of 
participants and the CUs were forced to compete with sole proprietors, who did not have 
to overcome all the agen~ costs that confronted the cooperative ownership structure. 
VIII. External Fmance and Institutional Incentives 
Although the CUs were conceived as complete financial intermediaries, offering both 
deposit and credit services, the bias in their structure repressed domestic resource mobiliza-
tion, which in turn severely restricted their growth. A limited number of CUs obtained 
access, however, to externally subsidized funds, which served to reinforce their ideological 
bias, while supporting a rapid, though short-lived growth. Increases in membership were 
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obtained as a result of the offer of access to highly subsidized external credit. Those 
members who joined, did so with the sole intention of gaining access to these loans and, as 
a result, the CUs became dominated by net borrowers. 
As most members were net borrowers, severe moral hazard problems appeared in 
the administration of the loan portfolio. Net borrowers, whether delinquent or not, do not 
have a personal interest in participating in any collective action to tighten loan screening, 
collateral requirements and recovery procedures, since rigorous administrative controls and 
sanctions for delinquency directly affect their interest as clients. These problems were fur-
ther fostered by the paternalistic nature of the contracts with foreign creditors (principals). 
Financial transactions were carried out exclusively between foreign savers and local 
borrowers. As a result, the tendency to supply less than optimal levels of internal control, 
marketing, loan evaluation and collection, was further exacerbated by these external credit 
programs. 
The majority of the external funds were disbursed to the members after having 
passed through three different cooperative institutions, each one with its own set of agency 
problems: confederation, federation, and credit union. Among the serious costs associated 
with this integrated structure are those linked to the political nature of its administration. 
The positions on the board of directors at all levels are determined through democratic 
election. As a result, there is a tendency for financial and political decisions to become 
intetwoven.17 Access to subsidized credit provided a very strong inducement for the indivi-
17 The manager of the Dominican Federation was elected to the Board of Directors of 
COIAC in 1973, and became President of the Board between 1976 and 1981. It was 
precisely during his tenure that FEDOCOOP received significant injections of funds as well 
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dual CUs to place one of their directors on the Board of the Federation. Likewise, the 
federations had great interest in participating in the Board of the Confederation. These 
agency costs, combined with high transaction costs of monitoring by the principal 
(international creditor), resulted in substantial borrower delinquency throughout the entire 
institutional chain. 
The presence of several layers of organizations and a complicated web of implicit and 
explicit contracts which lie between international lending institutions and credit union 
members strongly suggest that serious agency problems are at the core of the difficulties 
confronting these organizations. Given the extent of these agency problems, it is surprising 
that they have been able to survive at all. Despite these costs, the comparative advantage 
of CUs with regard to transaction and information costs, and limited effective competition 
by other financial intermediaries has allowed them to survive so far.18 The next section 
describes the introduction of effective policy reforms that created incentives for deposit 
mobilization. Through these reforms, the CUs were able to reduce (although not eliminate) 
the agency problems they confronted and to offer more efficient financial services to the 
rural population. 
as technical assistance from CO lAC. Although the very serious loan delinquency problems 
which led the Federation to bankruptcy were blamed primarily on natural disasters, the lack 
of any reasonable loan evaluation and portfolio administration at the Federation or credit 
union level suggests the presence of serious agency problems. The excessive dependence on 
external finance tends to subvert the democratic process, because of the correlation of 
political power with financial power. 
11 Furthermore, CUs enjoy tax exemption and implicit subsidies from donor funds as 
well as exoneration from reserve requirements. The CUs in the project did not receive 
external funding and were induced to keep liquidity reserves. While deposit mobilization 
ameliorates these agency problems, it does not solve them entirely. 
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IX. Deposit Mobilization in Rural Credit Unions 
A credit union that is successful at mobilizing voluntary savings deposits, not directly 
tied to the loan contract, as is the case with respect to share accounts, will attract individuals 
whose interest in the institution is primarily for depository services. Although the poSSlbility 
of eventually obtaining a loan may play a part in their decision to join, these members are 
primarily attracted by other factors, such as the risk-adjusted rate of interest paid on their 
deposits, the level of transaction costs, security as well as other dimensions of the deposit 
contract. Their interests are not the same as those of individuals who join primarily to gain 
access to subsidized credit. 
With the participation of net depositors, the financial intermediation by CUs begins 
to take on characteristics of a zero-sum game, in which the implicit subsidy received by 
defaulting borrowers is ultimately borne by other members within the organization, as 
opposed to benevolent external creditors. Those members with sufficient incentives to enter 
and who perceive the greatest potential loss from high levels of borrower delinquency will 
have a positive inducement to expend the time and effort to support improved internal 
controls, reducing the free rider problem. 19 
Given the complicated road map of contractual relationships that link international 
creditors to the ultimate borrowers, monitoring costs for the international principals are 
19 Monitoring costs may still be too high compared to expected pay-offs. Members who 
may suffer value consequences share decision-making power with others who not only do 
not suffer value consequences but may benefit from the value losses of other members. The 
problem is compounded by the one-man/ one-vote majority rule. Borrowers (with more at 
stake) may have a comparative advantage in gaining control. Moreover, a large number of 
today's net savers will be tomorrow's net borrowers. Thus, CUs have constantly switching 
principals and a large number of them free ride (Chaves, 1993). 
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prohibitively high. High loan delinquency cannot be resolved simply with greater loan 
supervision on the part of external principals. Unless the essential elements implicit in the 
agency relationship are addressed, greater credit restrictions will succeed only in rationing 
credit away from those groups within the rural population for whom these programs are 
designed. The contractual relationships must be revised, in order to include incentives and 
sanctions so that opportunistic behavior on the part of agents may be mitigated. 
When the development and growth of the credit union is based on local deposit 
mobilization, the organization is introduced to domestic competition. According to 
Eggertsson, "redeemable residual claims are a relatively low-cost mechanism for diffuse 
control, maldng a mutual a viable organization. The withdrawal of resources by residual 
claimants is a form of partial take-over or liquidation by the claimants" (p. 186). The threat 
of withdrawal of deposits as a result of the lack of confidence in the management of the 
credit union serves to constrain its behavior and ameliorate the agency problems 
discussed20 The board of directors as well as the managers of these institutions are also 
cognizant that they are administering the savings of their friends and neighbors. In the 
smaller towns this bas proven to be an important constraint on their actions. 
Between 1984 and 1987, four Dominican credit unions decided to participate in a 
pilot project designed to demonstrate the feasibility of improving the financial viability and 
operational efficiency of these institutions based upon local deposit mobilization. Between 
20 Although shares can be withdrawn as well, CUs have typically required that the 
member provide a written request to the board of directors. This provides a false sense of 
security on the stability of these funds since (because of the high transaction costs involved), 
the members would rather request an automatic Joan in the amount of their shares and not 
repay this obligation. 
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1988 and 1992, USAID financed a follow-on project in which nine more institutions were 
incorporated. The primary objective was to expand rural financial services through these 
CUs, because of their lower operational costs and advantages with regard to information. 
The CUs were provided with specialized assistance in the transfer of basic "banking" 
technology. The major areas of assistance included: accounting, financial management, 
credit evaluation and administration, asset and liability management, marketing pricing 
policies and analysis of financial markets and economic variables in general. Of the 17 
institutions, only two were offering financial services with any appreciable degree of 
efficiency at the beginning of the project.21 As a result, their active membership bad been 
precipitously declining between the late 1970s and mid-1980s. To participate in the 
program, a complete restructuring of their operations was required. By 1985, four CUs 
began to mobilize deposits from their current base of membership as well as attracting new 
members, with the introduction of two competitively-priced instruments: passbook savings 
accounts and time deposits. Both instruments effectively paid higher interest rates than 
those offered by the regulated banking system. 
In almost all cases, full-time staff bad to be hired, as only part-time managers were 
the norm. In addition, limited investments in physical infrastructure were carried out, with 
a small loan from the project. No external credit resources were provided, however, for on-
lending to the membership. All loanable fund bad to be obtained through deposit 
21 Only two of these institutions prepared financial statements on a monthly basis and 
most did not have a full-time manager, credit officials or accountants. Only one of these 
institutions managed cash operations from their office. Members were given checks to be 
cashed at the local bank. 
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mobilization. The board of directors of these CUs were aware that ultimately their survival 
depended on their ability to become profitable financial intermediaries, completely 
integrated into the domestic financial markets. The major thrust behind the reforms was 
to raise interest rates to market levels, and to widen operational spreads, to cover operating 
costs and lending risks. 22 
Table 2 
Dominican Republic: Rural Credit Unions. 
Deposit Mobilization. 
(December 31 of each year) 
Total Deposit Mobilization 
Year Number of CUs (DRS '000) (US$ '000) 
1984 3 1,766 573 
1985 3 2,829 953 
1986 3 3,967 1,292 
1987 3 6,895 1,413 
1988 3 11,728 1,828 
1989 3 16,872 2,036 
1990 8 28,900 2,140 
1991 12 47,800 3,760 
1992 15 85,800 6,800 
Source: AIRAC, unpublished records. 
22 Despite the fact that nominal interest rates on loans were doubled in some of the 
CUs, the effective rates in fact remained constant or may have even declined. The reason 
for this apparent contradiction was that the CUs required share accounts as compensating 
deposits. The dividends on these accounts are strictly limited, and it was not uncommon to 
find that the required balance in share accounts amounted to 50 and 67 percent of the loan 
amount With deposit mobilization, they were able to reduce these compensating balance 
requirements. 
28 
Deposit mobilization, membership and loans grew rapidly, despite the fact that the 
CUs bad a negative image as a result of their past experience with external credit 
programs.23 In addition, virtually all financial performance indicators improved 
significantly. The level of profitability increased, whfie borrower delinquency was strictly 
controlled. The improvement in the quality of financial services is clearly demonstrated by 
the rapid growth in membership after implementation of the program. Deposit mobilization 
grew from a base of about DR$1,8 million (US$573,000) at the end of 1984, with four CUs, 
to DR$85.8 million (US$6.8 million) at the end of 1992, with 15 CUs (Table 2). 
Throughout this period total membership grew from approximately 2,500 to over 22,000. 
Since the CUs were not subject to banking supervision, the project provided the 
function of inspection and prudential supervision. In addition to the constraints that deposit 
mobilization has imposed on the actions of the administrators, the project also supplied the 
non-existent supervisory role, critical for the efficient functioning of financial markets. 24 
The CUs established linkages with the banking system, which could not have 
developed without the significant institutional and financial reforms and growth experienced 
of these institutions. They have become large depositors, as they maintain a minimum of a 
23 It is also important to point out that during the period of implementation of this 
project (1984-1992) these institutions confronted a highly unstable macroeconomic 
environment and a profound financial crisis in the domestic financial sector (1988-1992). 
24 There are strong reasons for the supervision of depository institutions, accentuated 
by agency problems at CUs (Chaves and Gonzalez· Vega, 1992). In this particular case, the 
depositoradominated membership found it desirable to delegate this function to the project, 
which was believed to have sufficient incentives and capacity to perform this function 
effectively. Unfortunately, USAID /Dominican Republic decided to terminate the project 
before this function was consolidated in another institution. 
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20-percent voluntary reserve requirement on deposits mobilized, and some have become 
borrowers from the banking system. However, although the number of CUs is small, if the 
network were to continue to flourish, they could come to the attention of international 
donors, which might then be tempted to use them as a conduit for their social assistance 
programs and might again introduce serious moral hazard problems into their management. 
The critical issue to be taken into consideration to avoid this outcome is the level of 
external funding compared to local deposit mobilization, and the contractual conditions 
surrounding these loans. 
X. Loan Delinquency and Contractual Relationships in CUs 
The introduction of deposit mobilization in the rural CUs attracted members whose 
interest was to gain access to an organization that offered competitive rates of interest on 
deposits and provided a safe and efficient mechanism for the administration of their liquid 
reserves. These members introduced a renewed equilibrium into the administrative 
dynamics of the finn, given their interest in participating in monitoring activities. The threat 
of massive withdrawal of deposits by disaffected members has served to constrain the 
behavior of the CU management and Board of Directors. 
Traditional delinquency ratios ranged widely among the CUs and throughout 
different periods of the year. They remained, however, on the average around 10 percent. 
This figure represents arrears over the entire portfolio, calculated from the first day of 
delinquency. Most loans are amortized on a monthly basis. Default rates have been in 
almost all cases estimated at about 3 percent of disbursements. 
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An in-depth study was carried out of default rates at one credit union confronting 
what appeared to be more serious delinquency problems. A multinomiallogit model was 
estimated for a sample of loans disbursed by the Santa Lucia CU, over a period of four 
years (1987-1990), in order to identify those variables that contributed to delinquency 
problems (Poyo, Aguilera-Aifred and Gonzalez Vega, 1992) The sample represented about 
10 percent of the number of loans disbursed and 15.8 percent of total disbursement value. 
Delinquency, as calculated by the traditional methodology, had reached about 19 percent 
during 1988. During this period the CU was growing rapidly and channeling greater 
volumes of credit to the agricultural sector. It was hypothesized that loans for agriculture 
had a higher probability of delinquency than those for commerce or personal consumption. 
Likewise, it was hypothesized that the increasing delinquency was attributable to the rapid 
growth in membership, as the average quality of information on the membership declined 
as the numbers rose. 
The entire supply of loanable funds at the CUs was obtained through deposit 
mobilization, so the type of analysis carried out in the case of the ADB was not relevant 
here. However, since these institutions were highly diversified in all sectors of the economy, 
it was important to isolate the influence of different sectors on delinquency. 
The results demonstrated that over the 1987-90 period the default rate was 
approximately 2.5 percent of the value of disbursements. By the end of 1992, delinquency, 
as calculated by the traditional method, had returned to levels below 10 percent Results 
from the regression analysis rejected the notion that loans for agricultural production 
exlnbited greater delinquency than commercial loans, when compared to loans for 
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consumption, for any of the years in the study. Finally, the results offered evidence that the 
longer it took to analyze any particular loan, the higher the probability of delinquency. The 
longer the time required for loan analysis was an indication of the lack of knowledge about 
a prospective borrower. 
XI. Conclusions 
This paper has shown that the operational difficulties confronted by both the ADB 
and the rural CUs can be understood within the paradigm of agency relationships. The 
importance of this approach is to emphasize that the solution to these problems needs to 
transcend simple operational reforms and focus primarily on the contractual relationships 
that these institutions maintain with diverse principals. The agency problems confronted are 
not only a function of the separation of ownership and control, but of the contradictions 
among the objectives implicit in each of the different agency relationships. 
The contributions of the introduction of deposit mobilization in reducing these agency 
problems is a function of the incorporation of new principals: the depositors. The threat 
of immediate withdrawal of funds, placing the institution in financial jeopardy, has proven 
to be an important restriction not present in the agency relationships with other domestic 
or international creditors (principals). 
The recent experience of the ADB has shown that its operational problems are 
related to the agency problems that derive from inappropriate institutional incentives 
inherent in the terms and conditions of its relationships with traditional principals (Central 
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Government and international donors).25 Deposit mobilization created a new principal 
that has promoted the de facto financial decentralization, reassigning the distribution of risk 
and improving operational efficiency in the process. Although questions concerning 
government interference in the Bank's operations continue to present a problem, deposit 
mobilization has not only constrained the administrators of the bank but also officials from 
the Central Government. 
The rural CUs were the last institutional link in a long financial chain with very 
complex agency relationships that separate the international lending and donor agencies 
from the rural household. Although this structure proved very attractive to international 
institutions, because of the low transaction costs imposed on them, the difficulty of 
monitoring, as well as other important agency costs, seriously undermined the financial 
viability of the entire system. 
The weakening of this linkage isolated the CUs from the international subsidized 
credit flows, thus focusing their attention on the opportunities for local deposit mobilization 
as a strategy for survival. The introduction of these institutions into market competition on 
the deposit side served to significantly improve their performance. The CUs continue to 
enjoy a comparative advantage with regard to servicing rural households, because of their 
limited operational, transaction, and information costs. However, despite the fact that in 
many towns these institutions are virtually a monopoly provider, they have been unable in 
the past to exploit their advantages, due to extremely complex agency problems. The 
25 Because of these agency relationships, the ADB had failed as a financial 
intermediary. If the intention of the external principals was a free transfer of resources to 
particular clientele, this was an excessively costly vehicle for this purpose. 
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technical assistance that helped to introduce deposit mobilization as their primary source 
of funding, as well as banking inspection and supervision, has been a critical input in 
significantly reducing these agency costs. As a result of the associated appropriate 
incentives, the quality of financial services has risen and the significant growth in 
membership demonstrates that these institutions are filling an important void in the 
provision of rural financial services in the Dominican Republic. 
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